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I. Contracts.-The most cursory inspection of early statutes and
authorities discloses the imperfect nature of the common-law restric-
tions upon this subject. Prior to the statute of Charles, it does not
appear that any agreement was ever avoided by reason of being made
on this day.1 "Primafacie any act may be done on Sunday:" Baw-
lin98 v. West Derby, 2 Com. Bench 72, 80. Nisi Prius rulings to
the contrary may, indeed, be found in Morgan v. Bichards, 1 P. A.
Browne (Pa.) 171, and Smith v. Sparrow, 2 C. & P. 547, in the
latter of which, BEST, C. J., said, "I should consider that if two
parties act so indecently as to carry on their business on Sunday,
if there had been no statute upon the subject neither could recover,"
but these are devoid of authority, and the latter was abandoned on
the hearing in bane, wherein it was said: "There is no doubt that,
independently of the statute, an action would have lain :" 4 Bing.
84. So the oft-quoted passage of Coke, that "No merchan-
dizing should be on the Lord's day," was evidently intended either
as an historical account of the prior era then referred to, or as
merely directory; and the same remark applies to the subsequent
passage, "T he ancient law of England extended not only to
I Save that the doctrine of market overt was somewhat qualified, for "sale on
Sunday shall not be said sale in a market to alter the property of the goods :" Noy's
Maxims 2.
VoL. IXXV-.-35 (273)
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legal proceedings but to contracts :" 2 Inst. 254. See Con ns V.
Boyer, Cro. Eliz. 485; Rex v. Brotherton, 2 Strange 702; DruryJ
v. D1fontaine, 1 Taunt. 131; Bloxsome v. Williams, 1 C. & P.
294; 3 B. & 0. 232; Fennell v. Ridler, 5 Id. 406; Kepner v.
Keefer, 6 Watts 231; Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358; Bloom v.
Richards, 2 Ohio St. 389; State v. Williams, 4 Ired. 400.
In this country, the invalidity of such contracts wholly depends
upon the various statutory provisions, and while it is well settled
that no right of action can arise from an agreement to do that which
is prohibited under a statutory penalty, yet owing to the anxiety
of courts to prevent the religious nature of the day from being used
as a means of injustice the distinctions become, at times, extremely
refined. Few of these statutes totally avoid such contracts; the
main line of demarcation being that while executory agreements will
not be enforced, those fully executed will not be disturbed: Sca2fe
v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270; Shuman v. Shuman, 3 Casey 90;
Chesnut v. Harbaugh, 28 P. F. Smith 473; Greene v. Godfrey,
44 Me. 25; Moore v. Kendall, 1 Chand. (Wis.) 33; Ellis v. H7am-
mond, 57 Ga. 179 ; Myers v Xeinrath, 101 Mass. 366 ; H1orton
v. Buffington, 105 Id. 399. Hence a voluntary pledge upon Sun-
day cannot be redeemed without performance, and this although
the demand secured was incapable of enforcement by action: King
v. Green, 6 Allen 139. Nor can it be doubted that a delivery onl
Sunday passes the title as against creditors of the vendor: Smith
v. Bean, 15 N. H. 577; Banks v. Werts, 13 Ind. 203; Moore v.
Kendall, 1 Chand. (Wis.) 33; Moore v. Murdoch, 26 Cal. 514.
So a grantee accepting a conveyance upon that day subject to a
trust cannot hold the land discharged from the trust: Faxon v.
Folvey, 110 Mass. 392; and equity has restrained the collectien
rf a judgment procured in violation of such executed agreement:
9lakesley v. Johnson, 13 Wis. 530.
In a case in Michigan it was, indeed, decided, that after the
delivery of chattels upon Sunday, the vendor could tender the con-
sideration at a subsequent day and recover possession by replevin:
Tucker v. Howrey, 12 Mich. 378; and in Vermont, a refusal to
rescind on demand afterward made on a secular date, was treated
as an express ratification, and the defendant thereupon held liable
for a false representation at the time of the contract: Adams v.
Gay, 19 Vt. 358, infra, p. 279 ; but these decisions are anomalous,
it being generally held that in actions ex contractu a court will not
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interfere either way. In other words, no direct liability is imposed
by reason of acts done upon Sunday. Hence, there can be no
recovery upon a promise (Header v. White, 66 Me. 90), note
(Miller v. Lynch, 38 Miss. 344 ; Towle v. Larrabee, 26 Me. 464 ;
Pope v. Linn, 50 Id. 83; Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133; Smith
v. Poster, 41 Id. 215; Keefer v. Kepner, 6 Watts 231; Fore-
man v. Ahl, 5 P. F. Smith 326; Bosley v. McAllister, 18 Ind.
565; Adams v. Hamell, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 73; -ussey v. R9que-
more, 27 Ala. 281; Goss v. Whitney, 27 Vt. 272; .fill v. Wil-
ker, 41 Ga. 452),' bond (Pattee v. Greeley, 13 Metc. 284),2 war-
ranty (Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt. 219; Finley v. Quirk, 9 Minn. 194;
Murphy v. Simpson, 14 B. Mon. 419), guaranty (_erriam v.
Sterns, 10 Cush. 257; Moseley v. Hatch, 108 Mass. 517), or other
contract (Heller v. Crauford, 37 Ind. 279; Berrill v. Smith, 2
Miles 402; Bustin v. Rogers, 11 Cush. 346; Slade v. Arnold, 14
B. Mon. 287; Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio 489), made upon that
day; and in the absence of proof to the contrary, the lex loci con-
tractus and the lexfori will be presumed to be the same: Sayre v.
Wheeler, 81 Iowa 112; s. c. 32 Id. 559; Hill v. Willer, 41 Ga.
452; Shelton v. Merchants' Co., 59 N. Y. 258.' So no action
lies for a deceit practised in an exchange of chattels upon Sunday:
Robeson v. French, 12 Mete. 24.'
I The decision in Geer v. Putnam, 10 Mass. 312, which is often supposed to assert
a different rule (see Allen v. Deming, Towle v. Larrabee, supra), was based upon
the insufficiency of a plea in not negativing the exceptions of a local statute; see
Robeson v. French, 12 Mete. 24. An antecedent debt forming the consideration,
was, in Kaufnma v. lamm, 30 Mo. 387, considered sufficient to support the note,
but no authorities were cited, and this view does not seem to have occurred to the
court in Sanders v. .Tohnson, 29 Ga. 526, where the facts were similar. An endorse-
ment upon Sunday by the payee will clearly not discharge the liability of the maker :Smith v. Foter, 41 N. H. 215; although it may give no right of action to the en-
dorsee: Benson v. Drake, 55 Me. 555.
s But as the illegality arises not by common law but from statutory enactments,
this defence is, in Pennsylvania at least, inadmissible under the plea of non es
factum: Fox v. Mensch, 3 W. & S. 444. See Hulet v. &ratton, 5 Cash. 539,
for the practice in Massachusetts.
3 In O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 4 North Western Rep. N. S. 103 [March 6th 1880,
Sup. Ct. Mich.], the contrary was held, upon the ground that the contract beingvalid at common law, it presumably so continued until evidence to the contrary was
offered. But this hardly accords with the weight of authority: Whart. on Confl.
of Laws, J 780.
4 The case of Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358, to the contrary, is noticed surra, p
274 and infra 279.
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In Ohio a contrary doctrine prevails, it being there considered
that under the statute prohibiting" ccmmon labor,"only manual labor
is forbidden, and, hence, specific performance has been enforced of
executory articles dated and delivered on Sunday: Bloom v.
Richard, 2 Ohio St. 388, overruling Sellers v. Dugan, 18 Ohio
489; and this decision has been approved elsewhere: Johnson v.
Brown, 13 Kans. 529; Horacek v. Keebler, 3 Neb. 355; although
in the latter cases the contracts had been executed upon subsequent
dates.
So in New York it is held, following an argument formerly
adopted, but subsequently repudiated, by the English cases, that
the statute does not apply to private contracts, not notoriously
violating public order: Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend. 425; Green-
bury v. Wilkins, 9 Abb. Prac. 206 n.; Miller v. Boes8ler, 4 E.
D. Smith 234; Batsford v. -Every, 44 Barb. 618; Merritt v. Earle,
29 N. Y. 115; Eberle v. Mehrbach, 55 Id. 682; People v. Young
Men's Society, 65 Barb. 357 ; Sun Association v. Tibune Associa-
tion, 44 N. Y. Superior Ct. 141. In a somewhat recent case, how-
ever, it was decided that the sale of papers on Sunday was a breach
of this public order, and, hence, that the price of an advertisement
in such papers could not be recovered from the advertiser: Smith
v. Wilcox, 19 Barb. 581; 25 Id. 341; 24 N. Y. 353. But in
Missouri a directly opposite conclusion was reached by holding that
the only contract between the advertiser and proprietor was for
publication, and that sales were immaterial: Sheffield v. Balmer,
52 Mo. 474; see Commonwealth v. Teaman, 1 Phila. R. 460.
It is conceived that the weight of authority, as well as obvious
justice, accord with the latter view.
The effect of acts, admissions or part payment on Sunday, as a
bar to the Statutes of Limitations, has caused some diversity of
opinion. In Massachusetts, Georgia and Alabama such acts are
not considered to waive those statutes (Clapp v. Hale, 112 Mass.
368; Dennis v. Sharman, 31 Ga. 607; Bumgardner v. Taylor,
28 Ala. 687), while in Maryland, Iowa and, perhaps, Pennsylvania,
a contrary view prevails: Thomas v. Hunter, 29 Md. 406; Ayres
v. Bane, 39 Iowa 518; Lea v. Hopkins, 7 Penn. St. 492. These
I I I A man may acknowledge the truth on Sunday, and, if he does, I do not know
any rule that would prevent its being given in evidence against him. If a man
writes a letter on Sunday and sends it to his creditor, who gets it on Monday, or
even takes it from the office on Sunday, I presume it would be competent evidence
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cases all admit that no direct liability can arise from any contractual
relation created on that day, and the difference between them would
seem to be, that the former class apply to the subsequent promise rules
which would govern an action directly upon it, while the latter dis-
tinguish between actions on the promise and its admission as evi
dence of a previously existing claim, imposing no direct or additional
obligation (see Flinn v. &. John, 51 Vt. 334). And, apart from
this, it is usually considered that such acts or admissions may, with
other circumstances, be evidence as part of the res gestae, though
in themselves creating no liability: Rainey v. Capps, 22 Ala.
288; Riley v. Butler, 36 Ind. 51; McCalop v. Hereford, 4 La.
Ann. 185; Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270; Chestnut v. Har-
baugh, 78 Penn. St. 473. So performance on Sunday may extin-
guish an existing liability, though none can be created. Hence
a previous obligation may be discharged by payment on that day
(Johnson v. Willis, 7 Gray 164), but there can be no rescission
or repudiation at that time without performance: Benedict v.
Bachelder, 24 Mich. 425.'
Judicial notice will be taken of the almanac (Knox v. Clifford,
38 Wis. 651; Finney v. Callendar, 8 Minn. 41; Clough v. Gog-
gi, 40 Iowa 325; Christman v. Tuttle, 59 Ind. 55), but the date
appearing upon the face of an agreement is by no means con-
clusive; for a contract dated on Sunday may be proved to have
been erroneously dated (Drake v. Rogers, 32 Me. 524; Stacy v.
Kemp, 97 Mass. 166), and conversely, an instrument bearing a
secular date may, as between the original parties or those with
notice, be shown to have been dated and delivered on Sunday:
Pattee v. Greely, 13 Metc. 284; Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts 231;
Bank v. .ayberry, 48 Me. 198; Reeves v. Butcher, 2 Vroom 224;
Moseley v. Hatch, 108 Mass. 517. The latter proof, however, is
clearly inadmissible against a bona fide holder for value, without
against the debtor. As a bond or contract the suit is founded on it, and cannot
be maintained, because it is against a public statute, but as an admission it is only
evidence of a previous existing liability. The suit is founded on the previous lia-
bility. The admission is only evidence of the fact that the defendant acknowledged
that liability. * * * We cannot carry the law so far as to say that the admission
of a previously existing debt, made on the Sabbath, is not good :" Leea v. Hopkins,
spra. In Haydock v. Trae, 3 W. & S. 507, the action seems to have been
brought on the subsequent promise (p. 509), and was so treated in the opinion in
S, uman v. Shuman, 27 Penn. St. 90, 94.
1 Aliter, under the Nevada Statutes: Pence v. Langdon, 9 Otto 580.
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notice: Knox v. Clifford, supra; Vinton v. Peek, 14 Mich. 287,
Clinton Bank v. Graves, 48 Iowa 228; Cranson v. Goss, 107
Mass. 439; Love v. Wells, 25 Ind. 503; Saltmarsh v. Tuthill,
13 Ala. 390; Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 369; Greathead
v. Walton, 40 Conn. 226; Bank v. Arayberry, supra; .Hall v.
Parker, 37 Mich. 590; State v. Young, 23 Minn. 521; Begbis
v. Levi, 1 0. & J. 183. And in Pennsylvania, it has been said to
be far from certain that the bond of a justice of the peace, signed
and delivered on Sunday, would be invalid against those injured
by his official misconduct. "Such a construction of the act would
enable the obligors to take advantage of their own wrong, as
against persons who cannot by any possibility protect themselves :"
Commonwealth v. Kendig, 2 Penn. St. 448; Hall v. Parker,
supra; State v. Young, supra. Nor will a judgment be arrested
because entered upon a contract dated on Sunday when no proof
to that effect was offered at the trial: Hill v. Dunham, 7 Gray
543; Baker v. Lukens, 35 Penn. St. 146.
So, the date is immaterial, where a contract does not take effect
until delivery or final consummation: Commonwealth v. Kendig,
supra; Uhler v. Applegate, 26. Penn. St. 140; Beitenman's Ap-
peal, 55 Id. 183; Hilton v. Houghton, 35 Me. 143; Harris v.
llforse, 49 Id. 432; Clough v. Davis, 9 N. H. 500; 3.errill v.
Downs, 41 Id. 72; Prather v. Harlan, 6 Bush 185; Love v.
Wells, 25 Ind. 503; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 18 Vt. 379; Goss v.
W-hitney, 24 Id. 187; s. c. 27 Id. 272; Butler v. Lee, 11 Ala.
886; Flanagan v. Jeyer, 41 Id. 132; _Peake v. Conlan, 43 Iowa
297 ; King v. Fleming, 72 Ill. 21 ; Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 438 ;
Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232. Hence, the liability of a
defendant in possession for payment of the consideration, will depend
upon the time when this possession was acquired.' If the contract
was finally completed or delivery made upon a secular day, the
price can be recovered in assumpsit upon a quantum meruit, but no
warranty or terms agreed to upon Sunday will bind the parties;
Bradley v. Bea, 14 Allen 20; s. c. 103 Mass. 188;' Dickinson
v. Richmond, 97 Id. 45. See Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 141.
1 But possession acquired on Sunday, without the vendor's consent, is not proof
.f a contract upon that day: Hadley v. Snevily, 1 W. & S. 477.
2 Bradley v. Rea, which may have operated with some harshness to the defend-
ant, has been ably criticised in 6 Am. L. Rev. 350, but upon principle seems cor-
rect.
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So, too, compensation for services rendered upon a secular date, in
pursuance of a previous request on Sunday, can be recovered (Tuck-
erman v. Hinkley, 9 Allen 452; Dickinson v. Richmond, 97
Mass. 45; Stackpole v. Symonds, 3 Foster (N. H.) 229; AMeri-
wether v. Smith, 44 Ga. 541; Johnson v. Brown, 13 Kans. 529),
and a liability for use and occupation will arise from possession
taken in pursuance of a previously invalid contract: Stebbins v.
Peck, 8 Gray 553; Day v. McAllister, 15 Id. 433.
When, however, a contract is wholly made and delivered on
Sunday, the price cannot be recovered at all (Ladd v. Rogers, 11
Allen 209; Finn v. Donahue, 35 Conn. 216; Dodson v Barris,
10 Ala. 566; Mfeader v. White, 66 Me. 90), as no promise to pay
will be implied from the mere retention of possession :. Simpson v.
Nichols, 3 M. & W. 241; Perkins v. Jones, 26 Ind. 499; Pike
v. .King, 16 Iowa49. Such possession, nevertheless, is a sufficient
consideration to support an action upon an express promise subse-
quently made: Williams v. Paul, 6 Bing. 653; s. c. 4 M. & P.
532 (see Simpson v. Nicholls, supra); Smith v. Case, 2 Oregon
190; Sumner v. Jones, 24 Vt. 317; Ulough v. -Davis, 9 N. H.
500; Sayles v. Wellman, 10 R. I. 465; Winchell v. Carey, 115
Mass. 560; G-winn v. Simes, 61 Mo. 335; Melehoir v. McOarty,
31 Wis. 252. The case of Kountz v. Price, 40 Miss. 341, which
asserts the contrary, stands alone.
It is clear that the action may be brought on the subsequent
promise if a sufficient consideration exists, and cognate to this, is
the question whether subsequent ratification or adoption on a secular
date will sustain an action on the original agreement. In Vermont
and Kentucky such a result is allowed (Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt.
358; Sargeant v. Butts, 21 Id. 99; Sumner v. Jones, 24 Id.
317 ; Flinn v. St. John, 51 Id. 334; Cambell v. Young, 9 Bush
240),1 but the opposite doctrine is maintained by most of the other
I In Adams v. Gay an exchange of horses, with warranty, was made on Sunday,
and the animal delivered to the plaintiff being worthless, he afterward, upon another
day, requested the defendant to rescind the contract, which the latter declined to do.
The plaintiff thereupon brought an action of trover, and it was held that the reten-
tion of possession by the defendant, and his subsequent refusal to rescind, were
equivalent to an express ratification of the original contract, and that he was liable
for his misrepresentation or breach of warranty. But the principle of this decision
is far more extensive than is recognised by the weight of authority, and, very
recently, seems to have been so regarded by its author: 13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.')
542, n. to Frost v. Plumb.
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states, and neither part payment of interest nor express promises
afterward made, will create any direct liability on the contract
itself: Shippey v. Eastwood, 9 Ala. 198; Pope v. Linn, 50 Me.
83; Day v. McAllister, 15 Gray 435; Beeves v. Butcher, 2
Vroom 224; Byno v. Darby, 5 0. E. Green 281; Uattell v. The
Trustees, 62 Ind. 365; G-winn v. ,Simes, 61 Mo. 335.'
Much of the confusion existing upon this branch of the subject
seems to have resulted from the failure to discriminate correctly be-
tween those acts which are void, those which are voidable, and those
prohibited by statute. Few acts are absolutely void, and agreements
upon Sunday never are. No liability may arise from their breach, but
when executed they are universally recognised as operative to trans-
fer title or retain possession both as against third parties and the
grantor himself. Hence they are not invalid to all intents, and
cannot correctly be said to be void. The true distinction would
appear to be that acts which will not be enforced at all in any
shape, or which, under no circumstances, can confer a right of
action, are absolutely void, while those which will not be enforced
as against certain individuals are voidable, or, as is sometimes said,
relatively void ; and it has been well remarked that "a strong mis-
leading element in decisions is an undue reliance on the broadest
meaning of the ambiguous word void, which is so commonly found
in laws, contracts, decisions and text-books. Deductions founded
on the broadest meaning of the word would lead to greater errors
than are found in the most erroneous cases, while those founded on
its narrow and more usual meaning seldom err:" Pearsoll v.
Chapin, 44 Penn. St. 9; .Yeqley v. Lindsay, 67 Id. 217 ; Allen v.
Deming, 14 N. H. 183; Smith v. Bean, 15 Id. 577.
But the invalidity of contracts in violation of the Sunday laws,
depends upon entirely different and more flexible grounds--upon
I Dicta favoring an opposite construction may be found in other cases, as in Love
v. Wells, 25 Ind. 503, but in none was the question directly presented. Thus Smith
v. Bean, 15 N. H. 577, and Banks v. Werts, 13 Ind. 203, were actions wherein
creditors of the vendors attempted to set aside certain Sunday transactions upon the
ground that no title passed, and these cases obviously fall within a different doctrine :
upra, p. 274. In Sayles v. Welman, 10 R. I. 465, and Melchoir v. McCarty, 31
Wis. 252, the action was not on the original contract, and in Harrison v. Colton, 31
Iowa 16, the agreement was not completed until a subsequent date. In the latter case
,he court cites Story on Contracts, 619, as asserting that ratification revives the
original contract, but in later editions of that text-book directly the contiary is
ntated: Story on Cout., 756.
LEGAL EFFECT OF SUNDAY.
being opposed to motives of public policy as declared by statute;
and, hence, there is every reason to hold that as between the parties
themselves, or others with notice, no subsequent ratification can
remove the original taint, while, on the other hand, an innocent pur-
chaser will not be affected ; and even as between the original par-
ties, possession acquired under the agreement will support an action
founded upon a new promise.
So although no action can be maintained on a promise of marriage
made on Sunday, yet the marriage itself upon that day is always
regarded as valid, whether upon motives of public policy or as
being an executed contract: Gangwere's Estate, 14 Penn. St.
417; George v. George, 47 N. H. 36; Bennett v. Brooks, 9
Allen 118; Weidman v. Harsh, 4 Pa. Law Jour. R. 401.'
Where no recovery can be had on the agreement, the injustice
of allowing a defendant in pari delicto, to retain both the property
and the consideration, has induced some suggestions that possibly
in the case of continued possession of the specific subject-matter,
an action of trover might lie to recover the value of the property,
and that the defendant could not, under such circumstances, justify
his conversion by resort to the contract: Ladd v. Bogers, 11 Allen
209 ; Hyers v. Affeinrath, 101 Mass. 366 ;2 see Adams v. Gay, 19
Vt. 358. The point, however, was not decided in these cases,
and, upon principle, is open to grave objections, the general rule
undoubtedly being that money paid, or goods delivered, in pursu-
ance of an illegal contract cannot be recovered, and this without
regard to the nature of the illegality; see Collins v. Blantern, 1
Smith's Lead. Cas. 703 (7th Am. ed.), "The doctrine of the courts
in other cases is that what the parties have done shall stand, and
I In Gangwere's Estate, supra, the court, while upholding the marriage, were
divided as to the validity of the settlement executed on that day.
2 1 It is a question to be determined b3 the court upon considerations of public pol-
icy. But those considerations must be general, and not such merely as arise out of
the particular case. Where the payment or" delivery is made for the furtherance of
an immoral or illegal purpose, the court will not help the guilty party to revoke,
although another equally guilty may thereby make an undeserved gain. But where
the illegality consists in the time or mode in which the transaction takes place, and
not in the character of the transaction itself, the court will undoubtedly regard the
position of the parties in respect to the subject-matter. In case of a contract of sale
not executed by payment of the consideration, where the contract remains executory
on one side the law which declares the executory part of the contract void, might
well regard the partial execution ineffectual. It is not necessary, however, to decide
the point:" 3Iyers v. Meinrath, supra.
VOL. XXVIII.H-36
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that what they have not done shall be left unexecuted :" Yates v.
Foot, 12 Johns. 1; see Sykes v. Beadin, Law Rep. 11 Oh. Div. 170.
But although the consideration cannot be recovered, the tendency
of modern decisions is to hold the defendant liable for any damage
to property in his possession for a particular purpose, although that
possession may have been acquired by contract. Thus where the
bailee, in an ordinary hiring for a specific purpose, transgresses the
terms of the bailment, and, in so doing, injures the property
intrusted to his care, an action for damages will lie, although both
the bailment and the damage occurred on Sunday: Mlorton v. Gloster,
46 Ale. 520; Woodman v. Hubbard, 5 Foster 67; Harrison v.
Marshall, 4 E. D. Smith .271; Nodine v. -Doherty, 46 Barb. 59;
s. c. more fully reported, 5 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 346; -Frost v.
.Plumb, 40 Conn. 111; Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, over-
ruling Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. 822. "There is nothing to sup-
port the position that the delivery of possession of a chattel on the
Lord's day by way of bailment for a specific purpose in violation
of the statute will prevent the general owner from maintaining an
action against the bailee for uing the chattel, not under the pos-
session so acquired, but for an entirely different purpose not con-
templated in the illegal contract, and, of itself, amounting to a con-
version :" Eall v. Corcoran, 8upra.
In Rhode Island alone a different view prevails, originally based
upon the doctrine of a case since overruled: Whelden v. Chappel,
8 R. I. 230; Smith v. Rollins, 11 Id. 464. But in both these
decisions it will be observed that the plaintiff seems to have been
unable to offer independent evidence of the defendant's negligence
without resorting to the contract, and the court seem to have laid
some stress upon this fact; see Berrill v. G-ibbs, 2 Pa. Law Jour.
Rep. 296.
Whether the bailor can recover for damages happening on Sun-
day during the continuance of a bailment made on that day, is
somewhat unsettled. In Maine this has been denied upon the
ground that the liability arises solely under an illegal contract
which can confer no right of action, and that it is immaterial by
whom the contract is proved (Parker v. Latner, 60 Me. 528),'
and the law was held the same way in Massachusetts: Way v.
I And a note subsequently given in settlement of such damage was held to be
witbout consideration: Tillock v. Webb, 56 Me. 100.
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Foster, 1 Allen 408. But the latter case has been somewhat quali-
fied (Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251), and upon principle it is
difficult to see why a liability should be imposed where the pro-
perty is injured on Sunday after the termination of the bail-
ment, and refused when the damage occurs during its continu-
ance. In either case the original hiring does not necessarily form
any part of the plaintiff's case. The tort, and not the contract,
is the gist of the action; and the absence of remedy upon the
contract, cannot, in principle, effect the right to indemnity for
any collateral damage in which the nature of the possession is
immaterial, for it is familiar that a plaintiff is always entitled to
that remedy in which the proof necessary to sustain a recovery does
not disclose an illegal transaction, or, as recently said, "If the
plaintiff can show a complete cause of action without being obliged
to prove his own illegal act, he may recover, although such illegal
act may incidentally appear, and may be important even as explan-
atory of other facts in the case :" Frost v. Plumb, 40 Conn. 111;
Welch v. Wesson, 6 Gray 505. Nor is it a correct reply that the
plaintiff's participation in an illegal transaction removes the defend-
ant's liability for all consequences which may occur from delivering
possession in pursuance of the transaction. The logical results of
such a doctrine would deprive the plaintiff of any remedy in case
of refusal to surrender possession after the expiration of the bail-
ment. It is, therefore, submitted that the better opinion will be
found in the principle contained in the carefully considered views
of a recent case in Connecticut, which have been previously
endorsed in these pages by high authority: Frost v. Plumb, suPra;
13 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 541.
"The plaintiff," said the court, "in making a contract prohibited
by law, exposed himself to all its legitimate consequences. He is
not only liable to the penalty, but the law will refuse to aid him in
enforcing it, or in recovering compensation for breach of it; and
will not allow him to recover in any action which essentially depends
upon it. But it does not, in a case like this, deprive the owner of
his general property in the horse, nor place him or his property
outside -of the protection of the law. Nor will it in any sense
operate to justify or excuse the other party in the commission of
any wrongful act not contemplated by the agreement. Now it must
be conceded that an action of trover is not founded upon a contract.
None is referred to in the declaration and none need be proved on
